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Abstract  
As classical micro-political studies have shown, management behavior is not only 
constrained or enabled by certain cultural, structural and institutional patterns, but is 
shaped by individual interests and actor rationales. Based on the assumption that 
actors are neither the organs of given structures nor acting fully autonomously, the 
paper highlights how key foreign subsidiary managers interpret and integrate individual, 
socio-political, organizational as well as some home and host country factors into 
distinct subsidiary initiatives, which they then try to accomplish in negotiations with the 
headquarters. Empirically the paper builds on three explorative case studies 
undertaken in German-owned subsidiaries in France, covering all main forms of 
subsidiary initiatives (local, global and MNC internal subsidiary initiatives).  
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Introduction  
 
There is a long tradition of functional-structuralism in international business 
research. Classical studies such as those by Vernon (1966), Johanson and 
Vahlne (1977) and Dunning (1979) postulated a strong asymmetry between the 
headquarters (HQ) and its subsidiaries, with subsidiary development mainly 
seen as a HQ driven processes. Newer studies in the field offered by authors 
such as White and Poynter (1984), Birkinshaw et al. (see e.g. Birkinshaw, 2000, 
Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998) and Jarillo and Martínez (1990) have shown that 
subsidiaries as well as their entrepreneurial initiatives do play a more important 
role not only in the development of individual subsidiaries but also in the 
development of the multinational corporation (MNC) as a whole. However, what 
those scholars neglect is the role of key actors and the micro-political 
dimensions of subsidiary initiative and subsidiary development. Despite early 
claims that the “… research thrust should be directed towards the personal 
motivation of employees to pursue initiatives” (Birkinshaw 1997: 227), the 
interests, rationalities and behaviours of top foreign subsidiary managers with 
regard to subsidiary initiatives are still underexplored.  
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In this paper, we will go beyond structuralist approaches in discussing 
subsidiary initiatives by exploring the differentiating role of top foreign subsidiary 
managers’ individual interests and agency in HQ-subsidiary negotiations. 
Thereby the paper aims to contribute to the further understanding of 
multinational corporations as micro-political systems as postulated by Forsgren 
(1990) and more recently strongly emphasized e.g. by Bélanger and Edwards 
(2006), Dörrenbächer and Geppert (2006), Edwards and Kuruvilla (2005), 
Ferner et al. (2006), Forsgren et al. (2005) and Morgan and Kristensen (2006).  
Following Egelhoff et al. (1998: 215) subsidiary development manifests itself in 
terms of roles or mandates a subsidiary earns or captures within the MNC. 
Thereby different kinds of subsidiary initiatives, defined as “entrepreneurial 
activities carried out by the foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations” 
(Birkinshaw and Ridderstråle, 1999:14) are considered to exert a great 
influence. Following Birkinshaw (1997:208-210) these initiatives are directed 
either to the local, the global or the internal MNC market. Focusing on these 
three types of subsidiary initiatives, the paper will highlight the pivotal role of top 
subsidiaries managers’ interests in such initiatives as well as their skills to 
mobilise resources to support such initiatives in micro-political negotiations with 
the HQ. This leads us to two distinct questions which will be analysed by 
applying qualitative research methods:  
1. How are initiatives taken by top foreign subsidiary managers to gain 
further mandates or new roles linked with their socio-political and 
biographical backgrounds encompassing e.g. their nationality, their 
individual career interests and professional experiences?  
2. What sort of tactical and social skills do top subsidiary managers 
apply in pursuing such initiatives in negotiations with their HQs? 
Taking such a micro-political perspective on subsidiary initiatives and subsidiary 
development creates a need to eclectically combine different streams of 
literature (Clark, 2000; Sorge, 2005). Over the next chapters we draw on 
theories from rather different specialized fields with different levels of analysis, 
such as strategic and resource based views on subsidiary development 
processes, comparative institutionalist approaches which discuss the local 
embeddedness of organizational subunits as well as HRM-related research 
interested in staffing and careers across national borders. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First we will discuss the 
contributions and limits of current research, especially of so-called “evolution-
ary” and comparative institutionalist studies of the multinational corporation. We 
then  discuss the literature on managerial interests and career orientations 
within the MNC, building up a framework to study the role of agency in 
subsidiary initiatives. Next to a brief overview about our research design and 
methodology, we present three explorative case studies. The case studies 
stress the active role of top foreign subsidiary managers both in the formation 
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as well as in the accomplishment of such initiatives in negotiations with the HQ, 
illustrating trajectories of local, global and internally oriented subsidiary 
initiatives. This is followed by discussing the theoretical implications of our case 
study evidence, focusing on the subsidiary initiative literature. The final section 
concludes with a discussion of the managerial implications and limitations of 
this study and ideas for further research.  
Contributions and Limits of Evolutionary and Comparative Institutionalist 
Research 
Research in international business and management has been for a long time 
predominantly concerned with technological and economic constraints on 
rational information-processing and decision-making in MNCs. Scholars have 
focused on issues such as successful FDI (see e.g. Teece, 1992, Vernon, 
1966) or efficient adoptions and transfers of technologies and organizational 
structures (see e.g. Buckley, 1996; Casson, 1997; Egelhoff, 1993). In contrast 
to this research, evolutionary studies of the MNC concentrate mainly on how 
managerial strategies and the organizational design of the MNC are shaped by 
more or less unstable and uncertain international business environment 
contingencies, driving MNCs towards a specific best practice called the 
transnational solution (e.g. Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). This increasingly 
dominant paradigm was criticized for developing a rather narrow view of MNC 
management by focusing mainly on North-American multinationals, having a 
unilateral bias and concentrating predominantly on international expansion 
(Westney and Zaheer, 2001). However, the idea that an increasingly universal 
rationality is guiding managerial decisions in MNCs has also been questioned 
from various other perspectives. Some scholars, such as Birkinshaw (2000) and 
Birkinshaw and Hood (1998), follow to some extent the evolutionary logic, but 
stress that MNCs cannot be understood as homogenous organizational units, 
centrally controlled by the HQ, especially when they operate in a highly complex 
global environment. Here managerial decision making, autonomy and 
entrepreneurship of subsidiaries are seen as crucial to gain competitive advan-
tages and enhancements of mandates (ibid). Other researchers adopted 
Hofstede’s approach (e.g. Cooper, 2003; Watson et al., 1993) and emphasize 
that unique assumptions and converging rationalities in MNCs are unrealistic 
because the subsidiary rationales remains strongly shaped by particular 
national norms and values of the host country culture.  
Similarly to the latter, comparative institutionalism stresses the diversity of 
rationalities, organizational forms and structures. The key interest of this 
approach, however, is not so much in the socialization of individual decision-
makers in a certain national context, but how managerial decisions are 
influenced by the institutions of the nation state from which the MNC originates 
(Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995; Whitley, 2001). It is stressed that reorganization 
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of subsidiaries related to merger and acquisitions (e.g. Child et al., 2001), the 
transfer of HRM practices (e.g. Almond and Ferner, 2006; Gunnigle et al., 
2002), coordination and control (Ferner, 2000; Harzing and Sorge, 2003) and 
subsidiary work systems (Geppert et al., 2003) are heavily shaped by key 
elements of the MNC’s home country institutions, such as the financial, the 
educational and the industrial relations systems. Cross-national comparisons 
show why and how managerial decisions are related to certain home country 
institutional features, for example, how US MNCs tend to be driven by short-
term financial interests, compared to German and Japanese MNCs where 
decisions are more long-term oriented (see e.g. Almond and Ferner, 2006; 
Sharpe, 2001). 
************************************************** 
                   Table 1 about here  
*************************************************** 
Based on early insights by Westney (1993) and Kostova (1999), it was only 
rather recently that comparative institutionalists began to redirect their analytical 
interests towards host country and third country influences, especially on the 
management of the subsidiaries (see e.g. Dörrenbächer, 2004; Kristensen and 
Zeitlin, 2005). This can be seen, on the one hand, as a further development of 
comparative institutionalism by stressing that the degree of host country 
embeddedness varies between different host countries and, thus, how much 
strategic choice and local decision-making autonomy subsidiary managers have 
in a certain host country, e.g. by comparing highly institutionally embedded 
German with less institutionally embedded British subsidiaries in the same 
industrial sector (see e.g. Geppert et al., 2003) or considering influences of 
highly fragmented business systems, such as in Venezuelan, on MNCs 
operating in different industrial sectors (Marquez, 2005). On the other hand, 
these studies can also be read as a critique of early comparative institutionalist 
studies. It was found that in certain host country contexts local management 
decides only to implement certain elements of ‘best practices’ and ideas 
developed in the home country, as stressed e.g. by Dörrenbächer’s (2004), 
analysis of the extent to which German MNCs flee or export the so called 
‘German production model’ when operating in the context of post-socialist 
Hungary. Other authors see more heterogeneity of home country influences 
through contingencies such as subsidiary size, industrial sector and the MNC’s 
internationalization experience (e.g. Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2003). 
In summary, compared to many mainstream studies on the MNC which 
concentrate on various environmental pressures towards global convergence of 
organizational strategies and structures, the most important contribution of 
comparative institutionalist research is to show the remaining importance of 
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contextual rationalities, shaped by home and host country institutions. However, 
there are further contributions in the field that criticize conventional comparative 
studies for concentrating either on the home country or on the host country 
logic. It is therefore demanded that future research should rather look at the 
issue of ‘hybridization’ which means to analyze how home and host country 
influences come together (e.g. Becker-Ritterspach, 2006; Marquez, 2005) or 
react with each other (Sorge, 2005). What is of a greater importance for this 
paper however is a new research agenda proposed by Morgan (2001). He sug-
gests that future research should also consider actors and contexts beyond 
national institutional influences and analyze dynamic and conflicting issues in 
emerging ‘transnational social spaces’ within and outside MNCs. Even when 
new conceptual developments give some room for applying a more actor-
centered approach, the focus of analysis remains largely within the established 
structuralist tradition. 
These overall conceptual developments are also mirrored in the more specific 
literature on subsidiary initiative-taking. Aside from papers that classify different 
types of subsidiary initiatives (Birkinshaw 1997) and others that look at the 
initiative process (e.g. Delany 1998), most academic work in the field 
concentrates on structural determinants of subsidiary initiatives. Following a 
recent overview by Verbeke at al. (2007) it is the various impacts from the MNC 
context, the subsidiary context and the local environment that influence 
subsidiary initiative-taking (for an overview see table 2).  
************************************************** 
                   Table 2 about here  
*************************************************** 
However, what is missing here is a more bottom-up view of how actors (in 
particular top foreign subsidiary managers) actively influence subsidiary 
initiative-taking and what role their interests, socio-political backgrounds and 
social skills play. 
The Role of Agency in Subsidiary Initiatives 
Exploring the role of agency in subsidiary initiatives and subsidiary development 
requires, first and foremost, a clarification of the actor concept applied. 
Following the very basic premises of the micro-political approach (Burns 
1961/1962, March 1962), we see actors and actors’ organizational behavior as 
characterized basically by the demands an actor makes on the corporation and 
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by the strategies employed to realize these demands. We assume that actors 
are neither the executive organs of given structures, nor fully autonomous 
(Tempel and Walgenbach, 2003). Instead we see actors as bound to rules, 
restrictions and resources. However such structural ties do not foreclose 
systematic and individual variations in actor demands and behaviors. 
Systematic variations might occur due to different functional or hierarchical 
backgrounds in organizations, to different educational and professional 
backgrounds (Pfeffer, 1983; Fligstein, 1990) and, in the case of MNCs, to 
different subunit, national and cultural backgrounds. Individual variations in 
actors’ demands and strategies might occur due to the fact that the 
organizational behavior of actors is always taking into account the individual 
interests of the actor (Küpper and Felsch, 2000). These interests are often 
described as being closely related to autonomy, power and career ambitions. 
However, individual interests might also be shaped by group dynamics (Lee and 
Lawrence, 1985) or extra-organizational motivations such as altruistic beliefs 
(Ortmann, 1998) and personal identity constructions (Weick, 1995). 
We assume that the basic concept of social agency also holds true when 
looking at key foreign subsidiary managers taking initiatives. Basically, foreign 
subsidiary managers have to fulfill three different tasks, as: sensors and 
interpreters of local opportunities, builders of local resources, and contributors 
to and active participants in global strategy developments within the MNC (see 
e.g. Ferner, 2000; Birkinshaw, 2000). To what extend and with what basic 
orientation key foreign subsidiary managers translate these different tasks into 
individual initiatives does not only depend on the different contexts they operate 
in but also on the particular socio-political and biographical backgrounds of key 
actors as specified in figure 1 below. Relevant characteristics here extend to the 
interplay of key foreign subsidiary managers’ nationality, career ambitions and 
career orientations.  
************************************************* 
                   Figure 1 about here  
*************************************************** 
Nationality: Following a well-established categorization, foreign subsidiary 
managers are either parent country nationals (PCNs or expatriates), host 
country nationals (HCNs), or third country nationals (TCNs) (Harzing, 1999; 
Scullion and Collings, 2006; Tarique et al. 2006). These different types of staff 
are ascribed different orientations or perceptions (Chini et al., 2005). Usually 
PCNs are seen as strongly following a HQ orientation due to their familiarity 
with the MNC’s overall goals, policies and practices (Black and Gregersen, 
1992). Very often they are seen as most efficient in exercising HQ control over 
the subsidiary. However this strong HQ orientation is only with PCNs that are 
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not going native, e.g. by marrying a local partner, converting to the locally 
dominant religion, or taking up permanent local residence, as Loveridge (2006) 
stresses. HCNs, on the other hand, are seen as basically having a local 
subsidiary orientation, due to their socialization in the host country and their 
familiarity with the social, political and economic environment of the host 
country (Harvey et al., 1999). However following Petersen et al. (1996; 2000) a 
strong local subsidiary orientation is only with HCNs that do not have 
international career options. Whether such options exist, basically relates to the 
career schemes of the MNC and the skills of the HCN. TCNs are often ascribed 
a generically more balanced orientation between the HQ and the local 
subsidiary. However following Harzing (1999), their number is very small 
compared to PCNs and HNCs. Finally there is a growing number of foreign 
subsidiary managers, that does not fit into any of the categories discussed 
above, due to their bi-national, bi-lingual and/or bi-cultural biography. However 
to what degree these ‘hybrids’ do follow a local subsidiary or a HQ orientation 
and how this relates to their biography is still an open question we will refer to in 
our empirical discussion.  
Career aspirations: In addition to nationality, the individual career aspirations of 
a top foreign subsidiary manager might also influence her or his positioning 
between a local subsidiary and a HQ orientation. Career aspirations have the 
potential to sustain, weaken or break an orientation defined by nationality. 
Classic career development models, postulate that the career aspirations of an 
individual manager depend on her/his career stage, with the early career years 
aiming at becoming established, the mid career years defined as a phase of 
career advancement and maintenance and the late career years as adjustment 
to retirement (Hall and Nougain, 1968). Newer research has shown that these 
concepts, which strongly correlate career aspirations with age, are too rigid to 
cover the blurring of standard biographies. Thus, Hall (2002) proposes a more 
open framework, relating career aspirations of individuals to perceptions of 
whether they  see themselves as being established or not. Whether or not a top 
foreign subsidiary manager of an MNC is satisfied with his or her present career 
stage depends on various individual factors such as age, family situation, 
health, self assessment of talents etc. These individual characteristics, 
however, have to be related to organizational features, such as MNC specific 
career schemes and staffing policies, appraisal and compensation policies as 
well as support systems (Peltonen, 1993; Stahl et al., 2002; Bolino, 2006). 
Furthermore, situational features associated with specific career steps have to 
be taken into account, most prominently issues of geographic mobility 
(Mayrhofer, 1996), anticipated work conditions (work atmosphere, burden of 
work etc.) and changes in tasks and responsibilities.  
Career orientations: Following Schein (1978/1990), career anchors inside the 
person (defined by self-perceived talents and abilities, by self-perceived motives 
and needs as well as by self-perceived attitudes and values) function as driving 
and constraining forces on career decisions and choices. Based on these 
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premises, Moss Kanter (1989) distinguishes among bureaucratic, professional 
and entrepreneurial career orientations, with bureaucratic orientations being 
defined by the logic of advancement in the hierarchy of a given organization, 
professional orientations based on the logic of increasing knowledge and 
reputation and the entrepreneurial orientations based on the logic of increasing 
autonomy and innovation. As we will see in the case studies below, these 
career logics are important to understanding the kind of initiatives that key 
foreign subsidiary managers undertake.  
Contexts: The impact of these socio-political and biographical actor 
characteristics on subsidiary initiatives and related HQ-subsidiary negotiations 
has to be seen in relation to the corporate (MNC), the subsidiary and the local 
(institutional) contexts (Verbeke et al., 2007). Some relevant influences from the 
corporate (MNC) context on the cognitive orientation of key foreign subsidiary 
managers have already been mentioned, such as career schemes, staffing and 
compensation policies. In addition to these HRM-related factors, some more 
general organizational settings might have an influence on key foreign 
subsidiary manager’s initiative-taking, such as HQ policy on intra-firm 
competition or the shape of headquarters-subsidiary relationships.1 The 
subsidiary context accounts for the resources and capabilities available to a 
subsidiary. Managerial expertise (Rugman and Douglas, 1986), specific product 
portfolios (Hood et al., 1994), specialized technologies (Egelhoff et al., 1998), 
and internal R&D processes (Pearce, 1999; Florida, 1997; Taggert, 1998) are 
all seen as having a strong influence on the opportunities of subsidiaries and 
their managers to successfully develop initiatives and pursue them in 
negotiations with the HQ. Finally, the local (institutional) context consists of the 
location specific advantages of the host country (Dörrenbächer and 
Gammelgaard 2006), related government policy and national institutional 
settings (Djelic and Quack, 2003).   
Data and Methodology  
The case studies presented below are taken from an ongoing research project 
on entrepreneurship in German multinational corporations. Focusing on French 
affiliates, the project aims at elucidating actor rationales in processes of 
subsidiary development. The research design is exploratory and mainly based 
                                                 
1  Changes in the institutional environment are considered as having a strong impact here (Fligstein, 1990; 
Useem, 1996). In coordinated market economies, such as Germany, an increasing internationalization of 
capital markets led to stronger shareholder value pressures which have biting impact on the rules 
according to which subsidiary initiatives are evaluated by HQs (Vitols, 2004;  Jürgens et al., 2000; Tainio et 
al., 2001). These developments have the potential, as this study shows, to trigger a multitude of interest 
driven conflicts (Seo and Creed, 2002). Key foreign subsidiary managers might also find their basic career 
orientations as well as their practices and social skills developed under the ‘old regime’ increasingly 
challenged by the financial conception of the firm (Fligstein, 1990).   
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on qualitative interviews conducted in French subsidiaries, covering different 
industries, HQ policies and subsidiary management nationalities. The three 
case studies presented here are selected from a first round of interviews. Based 
on intensive preparatory work, semi-structured interviews, lasting between two 
and three hours, were conducted with top foreign subsidiary managers. The 
interviews were taped, transcribed and triangulated with the analysis of various 
documents. In order to appropriately frame and triangulate the subsidiary 
manager’s perspectives, prioritized in this paper, the HQ view was explored 
either through interviews or through an intensive study of secondary sources.  
Given the exploratory nature of this paper, the cases each represent one of the 
three main types of subsidiary initiatives as defined by Birkinshaw (1997). Case 
one represents a set of local subsidiary initiatives, case two focuses on a global 
market initiative, and the initiative in case three is focused on the MNC internal 
market. 
All case studies were drawn from German MNCs that are currently undergoing 
strong changes in the direction of a more pronounced shareholder value 
orientation, more or less ‘alienating’ these firms from traditions of the so-called 
‘German model’.2 The fact that the case studies are rooted in institutionalizing 
rather then in institutionalized arenas (see e.g. Djelic and Quack, 2003), means 
that there are significant and multiple incentives for key foreign subsidiary 
managers to come up with initiatives aimed at further developing their 
subsidiary. This is especially true for the key managers of French subsidiaries. 
Despite the fact that France and Germany differ significantly with regard to 
several key national business systems features,3 many scholars group 
Germany and France as coordinated market economies (e.g. Albert, 1991; 
Whitley, 2001). Both are economies that combine long term economic 
orientation with strong social equality and highly influential corporatist actors 
and government. Therefore, choosing France as a host country limits the 
potentially distorting effects that a weaker regulatory and welfare state 
framework might have on subsidiary management initiatives.  
Case Studies 
Case 1: A set of local market initiatives  
                                                 
2 The German Model is usually characterized by highly regulated labor relations, patient capital and a 
general orientation of the management towards technical aims (e.g. Katzenstein 1980, Albert 1991, 
Streeck 1997). 
3 A recent overview by Kleiner (2004) displays France as specifically strong in the centralization of the 
economy, in educational stratification as well as in the impact of social networks. 
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A middle-aged French Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a subsidiary providing 
marketing and maintenance services for a German supplier of agricultural 
machinery issues a set of initiatives to develop his subsidiary step by step. He 
displays a rather entrepreneurial career orientation targeting business 
opportunities in the local market. The primary objective of his local initiatives is 
to gain the cooperation of HQ for which his main resource is his personal 
relationships with several important HQ managers. 
After receiving a degree in mechanical engineering, this French manager 
started his career with a one-year internship at the HQ of the family owned 
German MNC. After returning to France, he worked in a company that imported 
the products of the German MNC, further consolidating the mutual relationship. 
When serious managerial problems occurred at the French importer, the 
German MNC took over this business in 1987 and appointed its former intern as 
CEO of the newly acquired sales and maintenance subsidiary. 
At first, the new CEO concentrated on building up state-of-the-art practices in 
his subsidiary to better fulfill the tasks assigned by HQ (primarily market 
screening, market communication, distribution and product adaptation). An 
important initiative of the newly appointed CEO was the relocation of the 
subsidiary from a larger city close to Paris to a more rural area. The aim of the 
relocation was to create more physical space to expand business activities. 
However, the 1992 agricultural state reform caused tremendous cutbacks in 
demand for agricultural machinery and stopped the subsidiary’s growth. The 
company’s turnover collapsed in the following years, which led to a massive 
reduction of staff from about 70 to 35. 
With on-site support from one of the sons from the owner family (now one of the 
managing directors of the MNC), the French CEO started looking for new busi-
ness opportunities in France. This led to an initiative to out-compete the French 
service subsidiary of another German MNC that produces a complementary 
range of agricultural machinery. In the end, the French service subsidiary of the 
other German MNC was closed and the task was taken over by the French 
CEO and his subsidiary.  
After taking over the new task, the French subsidiary almost doubled in size, 
gaining critical mass for more entrepreneurial activities. This time, the 
stagnation of the German market as well as the dominant position of the 
German MNC in its home market led to shift in strategy towards an increased 
company presence in the French market. Although the French CEO and HQ 
had reached a general consensus that the development of French market 
should receive greater attention within the whole MNC, the HQ appeared to be 
rather reluctant to support this locally developed strategy. The French CEO did 
not stop to lobby for this move and started to change internal practices within 
the subsidiary, enabling it to better exploit the French market. He also took the 
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initiative to hire German speaking product managers for every important product 
to improve the adaptation of products and services as well as the development 
of new products for the local market. These measures were rather successful, 
and they expanded the French subsidiary’s competencies in product 
development.  
Another initiative of the French CEO aimed at the local market was his so-called 
‘market communication’ project. Initially, the HQ was not so enthusiastic about 
the idea, which was to develop a product catalogue with information on all 
products offered by the company in France. So far information on products 
offered was provided in separate product information sheets. However, the 
increased reputation of the French CEO, close personal relationships to one of 
the owner-managers, (the manager who once was expatriated for a year to the 
French subsidiary) together with a supportive organizational culture led to the 
development of high-trust relationships, enabling the French CEO to get the 
necessary HQ support for his initiatives. In the end, the new catalogue turned 
out to be a great success, and HQ decided to adopt the idea for the German 
market. 
Despite his increasing reputation and influence in the HQ, the French CEO was 
never interested in a career at HQ for several reasons. One reason for this was 
that the family-run MNC offered only a few top management positions to non-
family members. Moreover, the French CEO could easily gratify his 
entrepreneurial orientation by addressing the many challenging tasks he 
encountered in developing the French subsidiary. Thus the French CEO 
recently obtained the HQ’s approval on a new initiative to relocate the 
subsidiary again to a more spacious location, which was seen as the foundation 
for future growth and subsidiary development.  
 
Case 2: A Global market initiative  
A German expatriate manager close to retirement, with some international 
experience and a strong engineering background, successfully meets the 
challenging requirements of a new HQ-assigned mandate, by drawing on 
subsidiary related resources (e.g. in R&D) and his personal social network. 
Spurred by his professional ambitions, he developed initiatives to meet some of 
the crucial technological challenges associated with the new mandate. 
However, he was not able to expand these achievements at a more global level, 
because of an increasingly strict shareholder value orientation of the HQ, which 
created a hostile micro-political climate for such initiatives. 
Technical and organizational challenges were this 57-year-old manager’s basic 
rationale for becoming the CEO of a newly-established  French subsidiary of a 
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Bavarian automotive supplier. Despite his considerable experience in similar 
positions in different national and foreign subsidiaries of the German conglom-
erate to which the Bavarian automotive supplier belongs, it ultimately proved 
difficult to fulfill the requirements of this HQ-assigned mandate. Integrated into 
one of the most innovative car production networks worldwide, the French sub-
sidiary was supposed to ramp up a blueprint for using new material in mass car 
production. Immediately after production started, it became clear that basic 
process innovations were needed to meet the quality criteria set by the car’s 
end producer. A painful trial-and-error process was required to cope with these 
complex technical demands.  
Accordingly, the French CEO negotiated with the HQ for additional financial 
resources. However his requests for significant financial investments were 
rejected by the divisional HQ in Bavaria with phrases such as: ‘Don’t bother us, 
it’s your job to fix the problems there’. This refusal of power holders in the HQ to 
support this challenging, yet very promising project, appeared to be related 
mainly to a dramatic shift in the overall managerial orientations of the 
conglomerate and its automotive supply division. Once technologically driven, 
the company ran into deep trouble due to several ill-fated financial speculations 
and other irregularities in the behavior of top management. As a result, a new 
CEO was appointed at the demand of the company’s major shareholders. 
Because the new CEO was brought in as a turnover specialist, the MNC’s 
former innovation and engineering culture was significantly challenged as a 
result of new, predominantly short-termist financial measures of the HQ. 
Controlling and accounting functions were strongly upgraded throughout the 
conglomerate. As a result, the automotive supply division was no longer seen 
as the company’s core business. This caused upheavals at the divisional HQ. 
Many managers left, and an even greater emphasis was placed on financial 
control.  
The French CEO dealt proactively with the constraints of inadequate HQ 
resources for improving subsidiary productivity and quality standards. As a 
university trained materials scientist, who worked for 13 years in the R&D 
department of a large German chemical company, the subsidiary manager was 
keen and capable of addressing the complex technical demands of car 
manufacturers. His professional experience as researcher, based on life long 
learning attitudes and strong analytical and design skills, enabled him to meet 
the challenges associated with the new mandate. Similar to the former case 
study, the managerial strategizing approach goes beyond just applying personal 
experiences and skills. By utilising local core competences of the firm and 
effectively applying limited financial resources, he managed to develop and 
establish a small local R&D unit. Even when the local labor market did not pro-
vide the qualifications needed, his reputation and his social network, build up in 
the 30 years of his professional career, enabled him to attract new qualified 
personnel and motivate own staff to support his strategies. The successful 
management of the HQ-assigned mandate was also achieved through political 
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coalition building, including with the labor force, where a  stable and low-conflict 
atmosphere was established within the firm, inter alia  by paying financial 
incentives, developing a stable core team of 250 employees and following a 
generally consensus-oriented management style when dealing with the works 
council and individual employees. 
By managing challenges associated with the new mandate, some extremely 
promising technological innovations were achieved, and the French CEO issued 
an initiative to fully explore the potential of these technological achievements on 
a global scale. Being almost at the end of his career, it would seem that 
reputation, personal intrinsic motivation and care for the development of the 
local subsidiary, more than individual career ambitions, motivated the subsidiary 
manager’s  active engagement in taking this initiative and pursuing it in 
negotiations with the HQ. However, in line with previous frustrating experiences, 
he failed to get support from the HQ for his initiative to further explore and 
spread the subsidiary’s local technological achievement globally. In line with the 
narrow financial control approach adopted by the HQ, this initiative was simply 
interpreted as being insufficient to realize the HQ’s short-term profit goals, or as 
the French CEO put it: ‘The HQ is not interested in measures that bring cash in 
3 years; they want to see cash in 1.5 years.  
 
Case 3: An MNC internal market Initiative  
A young, ambitious Franco-German manager with considerable international job 
experience, a hierarchical career orientation and a financial professional 
background used his insider knowledge about innovative changes at a local 
competitor as well as the human resources of his French subsidiary to promote 
MNC-wide organization structure reforms aimed at increasing global efficiency. 
His goal was to build up power resources within the HQ and develop social 
skills to support a further ‘financialization’ of the MNC initiated by the HQ. This 
approach is clearly also focused on qualifying himself for a HQ career. 
The 38-year-old ambitious CEO of the French regional company of a large 
German service firm, who was born in Germany, raised in France and studied in 
Germany, clearly displays a hierarchical career orientation. Following a trainee 
program at a large German bank and a short assignment as financial adviser at 
an engineering firm, he has worked at the German service MNC for about 10 
years. So far, all of his assignments at the German MNC have been abroad, 
with the first 7 years spent in Asia. When the German MNC sold its Asian 
subsidiaries, he decided to stay with the MNC. He was appointed Chief 
Financial Officer of one of the MNC’s French subsidiaries in 2002 and became 
CEO of the French regional office in 2003.  
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The CEO does not consider this to be his final career step. His personal 
statements and the rather instrumental way he uses his subsidiary’s mandate to 
participate in strategic decision making processes at the HQ level are indicative 
of his strong career ambitions. In addition to relationship management and 
corporate governance of the different subsidiaries operating in France, the 
relatively small French regional office is responsible for developing the MNC’s 
corporate strategy for Western Europe, encompassing strategic tasks such as 
M&A, lobbying, business intelligence. It is therefore attached to a much larger 
strategic development department in Germany. However, the most important 
initiative brought forward by the French CEO was focused not so much on 
further international expansion but rather on the internal ‘market for ideas’ for 
restructuring the MNC organization. Thus, the French CEO proposed an idea 
for streamlining organization processes in Germany, where more then 90% of 
the MNC’s business activity takes place. 
This initiative was inspired by recent organizational developments at a major 
French competitor. Based on new technologies, the French competitor turned 
its product-oriented organization into a customer-specific organization, 
unleashing a strong potential for rationalization (e.g. two full-fledged divisions 
had been condensed into one). Guided by his HQ career orientation and his 
professional experience as financial adviser, the French CEO carefully 
‘benchmarked’ the organizational changes of the competitor. Based on a wide 
array of social contacts with the competitor’s top management and local 
stakeholders such as trade unions, client organizations or regulation authorities, 
the CEO and his staff were able to conduct a solid analysis of the organizational 
changes of the French competitor. They drafted a detailed feasibility study, 
proposing a similar change for the home country based operations of the MNC. 
This initiative developed in France, especially its effects on efficiency, were 
fundamentally in line with the overall strategy of the management board of the 
MNC, which was under strong pressures to increase shareholder value due to 
falling share prices. However, there was also strong opposition to this initiative, 
especially in the two divisions affected. Thus, before the French CEO officially 
approached the board of management with the initiative, he started to build up a 
large coalition of internal and external supporters. Since this task went clearly 
beyond the mandate of the French subsidiary and also exceeded his personal 
capacity and reputation, the French CEO decided to team up with the strategic 
development department in the HQ. Another key reason for this step was to 
share risks, since, in the view of the French CEO, coalition building always 
appears to be a rather open process: ’Even if you try hard, you never know 
exactly what impact your personal relationships and reputation will have’. In this 
case, teaming up with the strategic development department and maneuvering 
around more powerful actors in and outside the MNC seemed to be a viable 
approach. A coalition of about 20 people to support the initiative was formed, 
including almost all managing directors below the board of directors, several 
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consultants and influential investment bankers. This coalition turned out to be 
powerful enough to convince the board of directors to implement the initiative.  
So far, there have been no direct career rewards for the French CEO, who 
continued lobbying for ‘his’ initiative even after the strategic development 
department had formally taken over the task. However, his reputation at HQ, 
especially among the board of directors, has definitely increased. 
 
Agency in Subsidiary Initiatives: Some Theoretical Implications  
Taken together, the case studies covering the three basic types of subsidiary 
initiatives, as defined by Birkinshaw (1997), clearly illustrate that agency matters 
with regard to subsidiary initiatives.  Our case studies show in some detail how 
the formation and translation of subsidiary initiatives by top foreign subsidiary 
managers are selectively and reflexively construed by integrating  personal 
interests, different social practices within the MNC as well as institutional and 
socio-economic patterns relevant to the MNC and the subsidiary. These overall 
findings have some important implications for the literature on subsidiary 
initiatives, which will be dealt with below.   
Based on the assumption that subsidiary development is to some extent a 
function of subsidiary initiative, we have seen a growing interest in furthering the 
understanding of subsidiary initiatives, especially the 1990s. As illustrated 
above, research has concentrated on three issues. First, research has been 
focused on classifying different types of subsidiary initiatives, distinguishing e.g. 
between local, global and MNC internal initiatives (Birkinshaw 1997) or between 
initiatives that aim at the creation of new, or the renewal of existing, subsidiary 
businesses (Verbeke et al. 2007). Second, research has extensively dealt with 
the question of what determines subsidiary initiatives. Third, the initiative 
process has also been examined. It is especially the two latter issues to which 
our findings contribute.  
As summarized in table 2 above, the subsidiary initiative literature so far 
concludes that various determinants from the corporate (MNC) context, the 
subsidiary context as well as the local environment influence the development 
of subsidiary initiatives. However, despite the fact that some determinants 
suggest that the behavior of key foreign subsidiary managers is important (e.g. 
strong leadership, subsidiary management credibility), little attempt has been 
made so far to systematically elucidate the interests, local rationalities and 
behaviours of top foreign subsidiary managers with regard to subsidiary 
initiatives. Somewhat of an exception is a paper by Delany (2000) that 
elaborates on the overall motivation of subsidiary managers to take initiatives. 
Reasons given extend to foreign subsidiary managers’ fear of charter losses 
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and a general desire to develop the subsidiary to safeguard the current career 
position of the subsidiary manager. However these are universal behavioral 
assumptions that hardly cover the fact that key foreign subsidiary managers 
differ both with regard to their socio-political as well as their individual 
characteristics. Our case studies show that these factors (nationality, career 
ambition and orientation) and their interplay with contextual factors have a 
strong impact not only on the general motivation to take initiatives (1) but also 
on the kind of initiatives taken (2) and the way they are pursued in subsequent 
negotiations with the HQ (3).  
(1) Looking at the key foreign subsidiary manager’s general motivation to take 
initiatives, our case study evidence adds to the reasons given in the literature so 
far. While the study of Delany (2000) basically considers initiatives as means to 
protect vested rights (charters and career positions gained) our case studies 
demonstrate that actors follow a much more pro-active and forward looking 
approach with their initiatives. They engage in initiatives to serve their individual 
ambitions, which being high in all three cases, were of a quite different nature 
when related to their individual career orientation. While in case one the many 
initiatives taken by the manager are clearly the outflow of his strong 
entrepreneurial zest for action, ‘going for a last big professional challenge’ drove 
the manager in case two. ‘Moving up the HQ career ladder’ can be seen as the 
ultimate reason of the manager in case three to take initiative. This can be 
summarized as follows: Key foreign subsidiary managers take initiatives not 
only to protect vested rights but to pro-actively serve their individual career 
ambitions and orientations.   
************************************************** 
                   Table 3 about here  
*************************************************** 
(2) The contexts in which a subsidiary operates (i.e. the corporate, subsidiary 
and local environment context) usually provide more than one opportunity to 
form an initiative. This is an important premise when considering the question of 
what specific initiatives key foreign subsidiary managers engage in. For 
instance, instead of proposing an internal initiative aimed at a far reaching 
restructuring of the home market operations, our manager in case three could 
instead have concentrated on initiatives aimed at the local French market. 
However, he did not do so because proposing a far reaching restructuring of the 
home market operations fit better with his pronounced hierarchical career 
orientation. This sheds some light on the crucial role of agency in defining which 
particular opportunities (having of course particular prospects of success) are 
turned into actual initiatives, an issue the literature so far has dealt with in far 
too broad terms. Refining the findings of the ‘global staffing literature', our cases 
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demonstrate that it is not only the nationality but also the subsidiary manager’s 
career ambitions and career orientations that have a strong impact here.  The 
cases elucidate in more detail how distinct hierarchical, professional or 
entrepreneurial career orientations have a strong differentiating impact on what 
particular opportunities key foreign subsidiary managers look for, take notice of 
and finally develop into initiatives by carefully orchestrating the MNC, the 
subsidiary and the local environment contexts.  
(3) Socio-political and individual characteristics of key foreign subsidiary 
managers do play a role not only with regard to what initiatives they engage in, 
but also with regard to the way they pursue these initiatives. Here our findings 
contribute to the literature on the initiative process. This literature, dealing e.g. 
with distinct stages (Delany 1998) and forms of the initiative processes 
(Birkinshaw and Fry 1998), has produced contributions aimed at uncovering the 
role of agency in the initiative process.  For example, a paper by Birkinshaw and 
Ridderstråle (1999) dealing with the ‘corporate immune system’ takes a closer 
look at the rationales and behaviors of HQ managers in the initiative process, 
while a more recent paper by Birkinshaw et al. (2007) describes what subsidiary 
managers can do to gain HQ attention. However, both contributions assume a 
universal behavior of the actors involved, based on their sub-organizational 
affiliation to either the HQ or the subsidiary. By focusing exclusively on 
subsidiary managers, our case studies provide a more differentiated picture. 
First, all our case studies strongly support the idea that social skills in mobilizing 
other actors’ resources and building coalitions play an important role in intra-
organizational decision making processes (Seo and Creed, 2002). In the case 
of subsidiary initiatives, such resource mobilization strategies can be directed 
towards actors in the subsidiary, in the local environment of the subsidiary, 
towards HQ actors or towards actors in third countries. However, the extent to 
which subsidiary managers follow these alternatives depends not only on 
contingent factors such as the support of local governments or the level of 
ethnocentricity in the HQ  (see table 2). Instead, our case studies show that the 
resource mobilization strategies of key foreign subsidiary managers also 
depend on their individual socio-political and biographical backgrounds. For 
instance, the decision of the manager in case one to simultaneously follow a 
local as well as an HQ oriented resource mobilization strategy is clearly based 
on his nationality as much as on his previous interaction with the HQ, which 
developed in a specific way throughout his work life (starting with his early 
internship at the German MNC, followed by a successful enlargement of the 
business and by joint crisis management in the 1990ies). To sum up, it can be 
maintained that social agency also matters in the initiative process, given the 
strong impact that key foreign subsidiary managers’ socio-political and 
biographical characteristics have on their resource mobilization strategies.     
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Conclusions 
This paper explores the impact of key foreign subsidiary managers’ personal 
motivations in subsidiary initiatives and subsequent HQ-subsidiary negotiations. 
Based on empirical evidence of three case studies in German-owned 
subsidiaries in France, examining a local, a global and an MNC internal 
initiative, the paper demonstrates that the personal interests of key foreign 
subsidiary managers have a considerable impact on subsidiary initiatives. This 
relates to the general motivation of key foreign subsidiary managers to take 
initiatives, to their decision as to what particular opportunities they turn into 
initiative, and to the way they pursue these initiatives. Next, the paper revealed 
that personal motivations driving key local managers’ subsidiary initiatives are 
strongly linked with their socio-political and biographical backgrounds. 
Specifically, the cases suggest that the different career orientations 
(hierarchical, professional and entrepreneurial) of key foreign subsidiary 
managers have a strong impact both on the general motivation to take initiatives 
as well as on the decision as to what opportunities are turned into initiates. The 
way key foreign subsidiary managers pursue these initiatives, most notably, 
what resources mobilization strategies they select, seems to be strongly shaped 
by their professional biographies, former career paths and current career 
interests,  e.g. whether they are focused more on subsidiary development or on 
moving up the hierarchy into a HQ position.    
Limitations of the study arise from the focus of analysis as well as from 
restrictions of presenting the initial results of an ongoing project. Taking a more 
systematic and more in-depth look at a broader variety of powerful actors 
involved in subsidiary initiatives, most notably actors in the HQ, would certainly 
broaden our understanding. The same is true for a more detailed process 
related analysis. Moreover, a more longitudinal research design, that is able to 
more extensively cover the biography of key actors as well as the biography of 
the HQ-subsidiary relationships involved, would help us to develop a better 
understanding of the historically developed potential for conflict and/or co-
operation in subsidiary initiative processes. Finally, looking only at French 
subsidiaries of German firms strongly limits the insights that can be gained with 
regard to the institutional and other environment related influences at work. 
Basically the study can only trace how key subsidiary managers interpret and 
try to make (different) use of the home and host country contexts. A 
comparative research design to be adopted in future research (comparing 
initiative-taking in German subsidiaries in France and the UK) might lead to 
more far reaching results here.  
Despite its limitations, our study has both practical and theoretical implications. 
Practical implications refer first to HR management and more precisely to global 
staffing policies. If MNCs really want to ‘unleash innovation in foreign 
subsidiaries’, as Birkinshaw and Hood (2001) have called for in a popular 
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article, staffing policy should not only consider functional competences and 
nationality but also take a closer look at the biographical backgrounds, the 
career ambitions and most notably the career orientations of candidates, in 
order to ensure a sufficient number of subsidiary initiatives with a high potential. 
Second, the strong impact of key subsidiary managers’ personal motivations 
and career aspirations on initiative-taking also implies an important control issue 
for the HQ in order to prevent subsidiary initiatives from ending in serious 
setbacks for the subsidiary or the MNC as a whole (as recently happened in the 
banking industry).   
Theoretical implications mostly relate to the current debate about subsidiary 
initiative-taking. First and foremost, the paper demonstrates that social agency 
matters in subsidiary initiatives and that this needs to be integrated into the 
literature on subsidiary initiative. Second, elaborating on the personal motivation 
of key foreign subsidiary managers to engage in initiatives, the paper has added 
to the literature by demonstrating that the protection of vested rights is just one 
rationale, in addition to other rationales that have a more forward-oriented 
character, i.e. key foreign subsidiary managers taking initiatives to serve their 
individual career ambitions and orientations. A final contribution can be seen in 
the introduction of ‘resource mobilization strategies’ as a core concept to 
understand subsidiary initiative-taking. Resource mobilization strategies link 
actors to their various contexts and it is in particular these links that deserve 
more attention in future research.  
The case studies demonstrate that mobilizing resources is a central element of 
subsidiary managers’ strategizing related to subsidiary initiatives. First, this is 
an effect of the resource constraints with which subsidiaries are typically 
confronted as part of a larger entity (i.e the MNC). Second, the motivation to 
engage in resource mobilization strategies stems from the strong leverage 
effects these strategies can have, if actors with unique resources can be 
aligned. A first interesting question for further research would be to study the 
relationship between subsidiary resources (defined e.g. by the role a subsidiary 
has) and the resource mobilization strategies chosen by its managers. Related 
findings might add both to the literature on subsidiary specific advantages 
(Rugman and Verbeke, 2001) and to the literature dealing with subsidiary power 
in MNCs (Forsgren et al. 2005, Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008) 
Second, the case studies provide ample evidence that subsidiary managers’ 
resource mobilization strategies can take different directions. They can be 
directed towards actors in their own subsidiary (such as the work force or labor 
representation bodies) or towards actors in the local environment (e.g. 
customers, suppliers, government agencies, universities). At the same time 
however, they can also be directed towards the HQ and other units in the MNC, 
as well as to actors in foreign environments (e.g. foreign suppliers and 
customers). Here further research is needed to clarify the compatibility of 
 21
resource mobilization strategies. While resource mobilization strategies towards 
certain sets of actors might go together well, strategies towards other sets of 
actors might lead to tensions or exclude each other. In addition to coming up 
with ideas on compatible and non-compatible resource mobilization strategies, 
research here could also contribute to the recent discussion on ambiguity 
management in MNCs (Kostova and Vora, 2007; Luo, 2005), focusing on how 
subsidiary managers orchestrate conflicting resource mobilization strategies.    
A final interesting question for future research might address the actor related 
characteristics underpinning the various resource mobilization strategies. The 
case studies suggest that resource mobilization strategies are not equally 
available to all subsidiary managers and that the socio-political background as 
well as the career ambitions and orientations of the subsidiary manager play an 
important role. Other factors such as duration of the assignment, language 
proficiency, reputation and social capital might also play a role. The interplay of 
these factors deserves closer attention, to determine what resource strategies 
are within the reach of a particular subsidiary manager and what needs to be 
changed or worked on to make use of them. This research could contribute to 
the still underdeveloped literature on subsidiary strategy (Taggert, 1998; 
Birkinshaw, 2001) and strategy development in subsidiaries.  
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 Table 1: Contributions and Limits of Evolutionary and Comparative 
Institutionalist MNC Research 
 
Basic 
Approach 
Variants / 
Authors  
Overall 
Contribution  
Contributions and Limits 
with regard to the study of 
agency in subsidiary 
initiatives  
Evolutionary 
approach  
Bartlett & 
Ghoshal (1989)  
MNCs are shaped by 
business 
environment 
contingencies 
(industry dynamics)   
HQ is seen as the sole actor. HQ’s 
behavior is seen as being shaped by 
industry dynamics. Key subsidiary 
actors are considered as unimportant 
and are not looked at. 
Evolutionary 
approach  
White & 
Poynter (1984) 
 
Birkinshaw 
(2000) 
MNC are shaped by 
HQ strategies and 
subsidiary 
entrepreneurship   
HQ and subsidiaries are seen as 
relevant actors. Their behavior is 
basically seen as being shaped by the 
different environmental contingencies. 
Key subsidiary actor characteristics 
are not looked at.    
Comparative 
Institutionali
sm   
Ruigrok & van 
Tulder (1995)  
 
Whitley (2001) 
 
Managerial decisions 
in MNCs are shaped 
by home country 
institutional settings  
HQ is seen as the dominant actor. HQ 
behavior is seen as being entirely 
shaped host country institutional 
settings. Key subsidiary actors are 
considered as unimportant and are 
not looked at. 
Comparative 
Institutionali
sm  
Westney 
(1993) 
 
Kostova (1999)  
Managerial decisions 
in MNCs are shaped 
by differences in the 
institutional settings 
between home and 
host countries   
HQ and subsidiaries are seen as 
relevant actors. Their behavior is 
seen as being shaped by home and 
respectively host country institutional 
settings. Key subsidiary actor 
characteristics are not looked at.    
Source:  own exhibition  
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Table 2: Determinants of Subsidiary Initiatives  
 
Corporate (MNC) 
context 
Subsidiary context Local environment 
context 
1. Decentralization  of 
decision making  
2. Level of HQ assessment of 
subs. management 
credibility  
3. Level of HQ-subs. 
communication    
4. HQ management style 
geocentric vs. ethnocentric   
5. Level of intra-firm 
competition 
1. Availability of specialized 
resources 
2. Strong leadership 
3. Entrepreneurial culture 
4. Good relations with HQ 
1. Level of industry 
globalization  
2. Dynamism of the local 
business environment 
3. Government support 
4. Strategic importance 
of the host country to 
the HQ  
5. Relative costs of 
factor inputs  
Source: Own exhibition based on Verbeke et al. 2007 
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Table 3: The value added of studying key subsidiary managers and their 
behavior in subsidiary initiative-taking 
 
Elucidates individual 
motivations to take 
initiatives 
Instructs on what 
opportunities are 
turned into initiatives 
Gives insights into 
resource mobilization 
strategies  
 
- Protect vested rights 
(such as subsidiary 
charters and career 
positions) 
  
- Pro-actively serve 
individual career 
ambitions and orientations  
 
 
- Feasibility of the initiative  
- Prospects of success  
- Fit with career ambitions 
and orientations  
 
- Direction of resource 
mobilization strategies 
(towards the subsidiary, 
the local environment, the 
HQ or a third country 
environment)  
- Strong influence of the 
actor’s socio-political and 
biographical background.  
 
Source: Own exhibition  
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Figure 1:  The Role of Social Agency in Subsidiary Initiatives and Development    
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